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INTRODUCTION 
In spite of the Erie doctrine, federal common law is still applied to 
decide conflicting state laws in diversity actions where a federal law, 
interest, or function is implicated.1 A federal court’s authority to 
substantively implement a federal common law rule over state law is 
most clear when the party to the action is a federal entity: an agency of 
the U.S. Government deriving its authority from the Constitution or some 
source of federal law.2 Analyzing a federal court’s authority to apply 
common law becomes more difficult where parties to a diversity lawsuit 
are private citizens seeking to have federal common law adopted to 
displace state law. While the application of federal common law in 
private diversity actions has been held to be proper by the Supreme Court 
in certain cases,3 the analysis and justification for doing so has remained 
relatively unclear.4 
                                                                                                             
 1 See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (finding that 
when the United States “disburses its funds or pays its debts, it is exercising a 
constitutional function or power” that “[has] its origin[s] in the Constitution and the 
statutes of the United States” and holding that “[i]n absence of an applicable Act of 
Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their 
own standards.”); see also United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979) 
(holding that “[t]he SBA and FHA unquestionably perform federal functions within the 
meaning of Clearfield. Since the agencies derive their authority . . . from specific Acts of 
Congress passed in exercise of a ‘constitutional function or power,’ their rights, as well, 
should derive from a federal source.” (citation omitted)). 
 2 See supra note 1. 
 3 See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (allowing private 
contractor to assert “military contractor defense” under federal common law to displace 
state products liability law); Hinderlider v. La Plata River, 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (allowing 
adoption of federal common law to apportion interstate water rights).  
 4 Compare Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956) (denying the 
adoption of federal common law among private litigants where effect on federal interest 
was considered too “speculative” and “remote.”), and Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 
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As a result, federal courts are left with limited guidance as to when 
the application of federal common law is proper in adjudications between 
private parties. Furthermore, a federal court’s authority to hear disputes 
among diverse citizens is not limited to actions where the court derives 
its jurisdiction from 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which makes analysis in certain 
situations even more problematic. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, federal 
courts have special authority to hear actions that are ancillary or 
supplemental to a federal court’s original jurisdiction over cases 
involving federal claims or federal questions.5 The Supreme Court has 
never directly addressed what the proper application of federal common 
law should be, or whether application would be proper at all in the novel 
situation where a federal court is exercising ancillary or supplemental 
jurisdiction between private litigants under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
It would seem appropriate to allow the substantive application of 
federal common law where the federal government is a party to an action 
in such ancillary proceedings. The Supreme Court has clearly provided 
justification for doing so where the authority of the governmental agency 
or entity flows from the Constitution or some federal source of law 
whereby the action itself furthers some federal purpose.6 However, it is 
                                                                                                             
25 (1977), with Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513 (finding “significant conflict” between state law 
and federal interest to warrant adoption of federal common law among private litigants). 
See also ROBERT N. CLINTON, RICHARD A. MATASAR & MICHAEL G. COLLINS, FEDERAL 
COURTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 750-81 (2003) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS]. 
 5 See, e.g., Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349 (1996).  The Court explained: 
 Ancillary jurisdiction typically involves claims by a defending party 
haled into court against his will, or by another person whose rights might be 
irretrievably lost unless he could assert them in an ongoing action in a 
federal court. Ancillary jurisdiction may extend to claims having a factual 
and logical dependence on “the primary lawsuit,” but that primary lawsuit 
must contain an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. The court must 
have jurisdiction over a case or controversy before it may assert jurisdiction 
over ancillary claims. In a subsequent lawsuit involving claims with no 
independent basis for jurisdiction, a federal court lacks the threshold 
jurisdictional power that exists when ancillary claims are asserted in the 
same proceeding as the claims conferring federal jurisdiction. Consequently, 
claims alleged to be factually interdependent with and, hence, ancillary to 
claims brought in an earlier federal lawsuit will not support federal 
jurisdiction over a subsequent lawsuit. The basis of the doctrine of ancillary 
jurisdiction is the practical need “to protect legal rights or effectively to 
resolve an entire, logically entwined lawsuit.”  
Id. at 355 (citations omitted)). 
 6 See, e.g., Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715; Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. 363. Typically, 
a federal court will not be exercising ancillary jurisdiction where the federal government 
or federal agency is party to an action since the authority to bring the action by the 
government is usually derived from the Constitution or some federal statute. For 
example, the FDIC derives its authority to bring actions under federal banking laws 
giving it federal question jurisdiction. Similarly, the SEC is authorized to bring actions 
under the Securities and Exchanges Acts. Assuming that the jurisdiction of a federal court 
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less certain whether a rule of federal common law may be applied 
substantively over state law in favor of a private litigant in such a 
proceeding. Surprisingly, this question has been addressed under the 
unique and narrow circumstances surrounding the disgorgement 
proceedings of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) receivers 
appointed to disgorge fraudulent transfers made as part of multi-
jurisdictional Ponzi schemes.7 
A receiver will bring a claim against an investor where the receiver 
believes the investor received fraudulent transfers in the form of “profits” 
as part of a Ponzi scheme. This fraudulent conveyance action brought 
before a federal court by a receiver is not brought under federal law nor 
is it connected in any way to the Federal Bankruptcy Code.8 
Furthermore, no federal uniform fraudulent conveyance statute exists 
under which the receiver may file an action for disgorgement. As a 
result, the cause of action against the investor must be brought under the 
color of state fraudulent conveyance law.9 Consequently, extraordinary 
conflicts-of-law issues arise in disgorgement proceedings where transfers 
have been made to investors across state lines as part of multi-state Ponzi 
schemes. Conflicts-of-law exist because of the great divergence from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction in fraudulent conveyance law as well as other 
relevant state law which may be applicable to the proceeding.10 
In such disgorgement proceedings, elaborate and well-reasoned 
arguments can be made for the application of state law favorable to the 
Ponzi scheme investor since it is never clear which state law is applicable 
when considering the form in which transfers are made and to the entity 
or entities to which the transfers are made.11 For example, an investor 
who is a shareholder of an offshore entity can conceivably manipulate 
                                                                                                             
exercising ancillary jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is akin to diversity jurisdiction, 
(as discussed in Part II.B.), if a federal interest or function was implicated in an ancillary 
suit of the federal government’s, the logic of Clearfield Trust and Kimbell Foods could 
be controlling. 
 7 See Bryan v. Bartlett, 435 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1970); Terry v. June, 359 F. Supp. 2d 
510 (W.D. Va. 2005). 
 8 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 9 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 10 For example, Michigan follows the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). See 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 566-34 (2004). Under this law, a debtor may not transfer assets 
with “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor,” but will not 
void transfers made to “a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent 
value . . . .” Id. In contrast, Virginia law will void conveyances made with “intent to 
delay, hinder, or defraud creditors” exempting a “purchaser for valuable consideration, 
unless it appears that he had notice of [fraud] . . . .” See VA. CODE. ANN. § 55.80; see also 
Terry, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 516. The key distinction between the two is the “notice” 
requirement under the Virginia Statute. 
 11 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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state veil-piercing doctrines to thwart disgorgement.12 As a consequence, 
uniformity of outcome in such proceedings is lost and the receiver is 
burdened with choice of law issues with each subsequent disgorgement 
action filed against Ponzi scheme investors from different jurisdictions.  
This substantially increases the receiver’s time and cost of litigation and 
ultimately decreases the total amount of recovered funds available for 
distribution to defrauded investors. 
The Eighth Circuit has suggested that a receiver appointed by a 
federal court to disgorge fraudulent transfers as part of a Ponzi scheme is 
serving a federal interest and function.13 The court reasoned that a 
federally appointed receiver serves as a quasi-federal entity (similar to 
the FDIC) to enforce the Securities and Exchange Acts by disgorging 
illegal profits made from violations of the Acts and is thus 
simultaneously serving a federal interest and function.14 This proposition 
supported the application of a uniform fraudulent conveyance rule under 
a federal common law standard in one such ancillary proceeding15 and 
could conceivably serve as the standard in the future for other similar 
ancillary proceedings involving private litigants. Furthermore, the 
decision may have broader implications concerning the substantive 
application of federal common law over state law in ancillary 
proceedings. 
It is well recognized that the application of federal common law 
implicates major constitutional concerns.16 Indeed, a federal court 
exercising authority to implement common law does “engage in 
interstitial ‘lawmaking,’ as part of the process of interpreting positive 
law”17 raising serious separation of powers issues. Federal judge-made 
law may also have the consequence of impeding upon the autonomy and 
independence of states by preempting state law signaling federalism 
concerns.18 Although the Supreme Court has arguably narrowed the 
scope of federal common law to “several well-recognized enclaves,”19 it 
has done so by “‘simply [listing] areas of law or categories of cases in 
                                                                                                             
 12 See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 13 See Bryan v. Bartlett, 435 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1970). 
 14 Id. 
 15 See Terry v. June, 359 F. Supp. 2d 510 (W.D. Va. 2005). 
 16 See generally Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural 
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245 (1996); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common 
Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An “Institutionalist” 
Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761 (1989). 
 17 Clark, supra note 16, at 1248. 
 18 See id. 
 19 Id. at 1250. 
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which federal common law is permissible’ without providing any 
‘underlying rationale other than grandfathering.’”20 
It is the purpose of this paper to trace the development of SEC 
appointed receiverships in the Ponzi scheme context and analyze whether 
the analogy made by the Eighth Circuit, namely that these receivers are 
quasi-federal agents serving federal purposes and functions, can be 
reconciled with the Erie doctrine. Part I of this paper will give a general 
overview of the evolution of federal common law since the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Erie. A careful analysis of the development of federal 
common law in the post-Erie era reveals that the substantive application 
of a rule of federal common law over state law would be met with the 
least level of objection when two circumstances are satisfied all of which 
are directly implicated in the ancillary disgorgement proceeding of the 
SEC appointed receiver. 
The first scenario occurs when the party claiming the benefit of the 
federal common law rule derives their authority directly from either the 
Constitution or some federal source of law creating a “uniquely federal 
interest.”21  The second circumstance arises when the consequence of not 
substantively adopting the federal common law formulation over state 
law shatters uniformity in outcome having the ultimate consequence of 
frustrating an integral federal purpose of an Act of Congress or some 
other integral federal policy. Simultaneously, the frustration of federal 
purpose must also be the result of a state law’s conflict with the federal 
purpose which will either override or will be irrelevant to a state’s 
reliance on the displaced law. 
When these circumstances are implicated, it is generally the case 
that traditional constitutional dangers of substantively applying federal 
common law are not implicated. Specifically, this paper will show that 
the federalism concerns of the Erie doctrine are not at issue when federal 
common law is adopted in the disgorgement proceedings of SEC 
appointed receivers. However, separation of powers issues (the analysis 
of which is conspicuously less developed in the major Supreme Court 
cases allowing the adoption of federal common law rules over state law) 
may be of concern when considering what law should be adopted as 
federal judge-made law in ancillary proceedings to displace conflicting 
                                                                                                             
 20 Martha A. Fields, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. 
L. REV. 881, 911-12 (1986) (citation omitted). 
 21 In the majority of these cases, this party has either been the government of the 
United States or an executive agency of the United States. See, e.g., O’Melveny & Myers 
v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (2004); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979);  
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).  
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state laws. Nevertheless, it is likely not to a degree significant enough to 
allow for the frustration of integral federal functions. 
Part II of this paper will show how the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in 
Bryan v. Bartlett22 falls within the scheme enumerated above. First, this 
part will give a brief overview and background of Ponzi schemes and the 
impetus behind appointment of receivers for the benefit of defrauded 
investors from such schemes. Secondly, this part will highlight the 
conflicts of law issues which arise in ancillary disgorgement proceedings 
brought by federally appointed receivers over entities used in multi-state 
Ponzi schemes. Furthermore, it will discuss how resolution of these 
issues can frustrate the receiver’s ability to recover “false profits” from 
investors for the benefit of defrauded investors and how conflicts 
analysis can conceivably benefit investors investing as offshore entities 
upsetting the receiver’s recovery efforts. This portion of Part II will 
primarily discuss how the facts of a multinational Ponzi scheme led a 
federal district court in the Western District of Virginia exercising 
ancillary jurisdiction to adopt the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act 
(“UFTA”) as federal common law using the Eighth Circuit’s rationale. 
Part III concludes. 
I. BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
Though Justice Brandeis famously asserted in Erie v. Tompkins, 
“[t]here is no federal general common law,”23 the decisions of the 
Supreme Court following Erie clearly show the application of federal 
common law as a rule of decision over state law is proper under certain 
conditions.24 In fact, on the same day Erie was decided, the Supreme 
Court allowed the adoption of a general rule of decision under federal 
common law to apportion the water of an interstate stream between two 
states.25 As a general rule, the Court has stated “in the absence of an 
applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the 
governing rule of law according to their own standards.”26 
However, the substantive application of federal common law, 
where there is a dispute between two states, still carries with it serious 
constitutional concerns.27 Primarily, problems with separation of powers 
                                                                                                             
 22 435 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1970). 
 23 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 24 See cases cited supra note 1. 
 25 See Clark, supra note 16, at 1264 (citing Hinderlider v. La Plata River, 304 U.S. 
92, 110 (1938)); see also FEDERAL COURTS at 761. 
 26 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943). 
 27 Clark, supra note 16, at 1248; Redish, supra note 16, at 765. 
38 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 3:031 
and federalism may arise.28 Professor Bradford R. Clark adequately 
explains the dilemma: 
First, federal common law, because not clearly rooted in statutory 
or constitutional sources, appears to involve judicial lawmaking - 
a task at least in tension with federal separation of powers. To be 
sure, federal courts undoubtedly engage in interstitial 
“lawmaking,” as part of the process of interpreting positive law. 
By hypothesis, at least, federal common lawmaking begins where 
interpretation ends. Such open-ended lawmaking by courts raises 
constitutional concerns because it bears a troublesome 
resemblance to the exercise of legislative power-power 
apparently reserved by the Constitution to the political branches. 
 
  Second, because federal common law preempts state law, 
federal common law also raises two related federalism concerns, 
at least as applied to matters within the legislative competence of 
the states. Federal common law arguably intrudes upon state 
authority by departing from the Constitution and the Rules of 
Decision Act, which—as interpreted in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins—appear to require federal courts to apply state law 
“except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by 
Acts of Congress.” Federal common law further threatens the 
autonomy and independence of the states by requiring state 
courts to apply federal judge-made law notwithstanding contrary 
state law, even though the Constitution’s reference to the 
“supreme Law of the Land” does not obviously include federal 
judge-made law.29 
In response to these concerns, the Supreme Court has spoken in 
terms of limiting the scope of federal common law to “several well-
recognized enclaves.”30 The Supreme Court has recognized those 
enclaves to be “in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights 
and obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes 
implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign 
nations, and admiralty cases.”31 While some commentators suggest the 
“enclave” approach provides some foundation for courts to “mitigate the 
constitutional difficulties,”32 others observe they provide little in the way 
of guidance since they “‘simply [list] areas of law or categories of cases 
                                                                                                             
 28 See Clark, supra note 16. 
 29 Id. at 1248-49 (citation omitted). 
 30 Id. at 1249 (citing Tex. Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 641(1981); 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426-27 (1964)). 
 31 Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 641; see also Clark, supra note 16, at 1248. 
 32 Clark, supra, note 16, at 1248. 
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in which federal common law is permissible’ without providing any 
‘underlying rationale other than grandfathering.’”33 
Commentators have struggled with fashioning a uniform standard 
for courts to adopt when applying a federal common law rule of 
decision.34 Indeed, the application of federal common law is amorphous 
and enigmatic considering the relatively low level of35 and seemingly 
inconsistent36 guidance provided by the Supreme Court. This paper does 
not assert any proposed approach is applicable to the ancillary 
disgorgement proceeding of an SEC appointed receiver. It merely 
observes that the constitutional questions surrounding the substantive 
application of federal common law to these sorts of proceedings, mainly 
questions of federalism, are not necessarily implicated as a practical 
matter in these ancillary proceedings. Whether the application of a 
substantive rule of federal common law is appropriate in the 
constitutional sense is subject to philosophical constitutional inquiry and 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
A. Evolution of Federal Common Law in the Post-Erie Era 
In the post-Erie era, the Supreme Court has addressed the 
application of federal common law in cases where the U.S. government 
has been a party37 as well as in diversity actions between private 
parties.38 While the Supreme Court’s rationale for allowing or denying 
the application of federal common law is relatively unclear and possibly 
inconsistent especially with respect to private parties,39 the substantive 
application of federal common law over state law is clearest under three 
distinct and recognizable circumstances. A brief overview of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions regarding federal common law in cases 
involving both the federal government and private citizens as parties over 
the last six decades reveals such a trend. 
                                                                                                             
 33 Id. (citing Fields, supra note 20, at 911-12). 
 34 E.g., Clark, supra note 16, at 1251 (advocating a “reconceptualization” of federal 
common law.); Fields, supra note 20 (adopting the approach that “federal [common] law 
can apply whenever federal interests require a federal solution.”); Redish, supra note 16, 
at 766-67 (strictly construing the Rules of Decision Act); see also Louise Weinberg, 
Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805 (1989). 
 35 See Fields, supra note 20. 
 36 See cases cited supra note 3. 
 37 See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); Clearfield 
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943);  see also D’Oench, Duhme & Co. 
v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (holding FDIC was a federal corporation exercising an 
important federal interest). 
 38 See cases cited supra note 3. 
 39 See id.; see also FEDERAL COURTS at 774-75. 
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1. The Federal Government as a Litigant 
The clearest and most frequently cited Supreme Court decision 
regarding the application of federal common law to displace state law 
where the federal government is a litigant is perhaps Clearfield Trust Co. 
v. United States.40 In Clearfield Trust, the United States was attempting 
to recover from Clearfield Trust funds drawn through a forged 
endorsement upon a check issued by the U.S. government.41 Clearfield 
Trust had guaranteed all prior endorsements upon the check in 
compliance with federal regulations prior to presenting it to the Federal 
Reserve Bank for payment.42 The forgery was reported to the United 
States but was not immediately made known to Clearfield Trust.43 
Subsequently, an action against Clearfield Trust was brought in federal 
court by the U.S. several months later. At issue was whether the rights of 
the parties were governed by state law and whether the federal 
government was barred from recovery for unreasonable delay as a 
result.44 
The Supreme Court held: 
  We agree . . . that the rule of [Erie] does not apply to this 
action. The rights and duties of the United States on commercial 
paper which it issues are governed by federal rather than local 
law. When the United States disburses its funds or pays its debts, 
it is exercising a constitutional function or power. This check was 
issued for services performed under the Federal Emergency 
Relief Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 115. The authority to issue the check 
had its origin in the Constitution and the statutes of the United 
States and was in no way dependent on the laws of Pennsylvania 
or of any other state. The duties imposed upon the United States 
and the rights acquired by it as a result of the issuance find their 
roots in the same federal sources. In absence of an applicable Act 
of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing 
rule of law according to their own standards. . . . 
In our choice of the applicable federal rule we have 
occasionally selected state law. But reasons which may make 
state law at times the appropriate federal rule are singularly 
inappropriate here. The issuance of commercial paper by the 
United States is on a vast scale and transactions in that paper 
from issuance to payment will commonly occur in several states. 
                                                                                                             
 40 318 U.S. 363 (1943). 
 41 Id. at 365. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 366. 
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The application of state law, even without the conflict of laws 
rules of the forum, would subject the rights and duties of the 
United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great 
diversity in results by making identical transactions subject to the 
vagaries of the laws of the several states. The desirability of a 
uniform rule is plain.45 
From the Court’s ruling in Clearfield Trust, it is evident that where 
the authority of the government comes directly from a federal source, the 
source being either the Constitution or a federal statute, the need for 
applying a rule of federal common law may be warranted.46 The Court 
suggests the need is increased if the application of state law “would 
subject the rights and duties of the United States to exceptional 
uncertainty”47 and result in “making identical transactions subject to the 
vagaries of the laws of the several states.”48 The ultimate effect of 
adopting state law in this case would have been to frustrate the federal 
government’s ability to discharge its duties. The forged check in this case 
was an offense against the United States.49 As the Court discussed, the 
U.S. had a clear right and duty to sue for recovery on this check; a right 
which flowed from the Constitution and the statutes of the United 
States.50 
Therefore, the principle to be drawn from Clearfield Trust with 
respect to the application of federal common law over state law is that 
where the federal government is a party to an action, if the source of the 
government’s authority is derived from the Constitution or from a 
“statute[] of the United States,”51 the adoption of a uniform rule is proper 
if the adoption of state law would shatter uniformity and frustrate an 
essential federal interest.52 The Court appeared to implicate a problem 
with adopting a rule of state law in a manner which would seriously 
impede the government’s ability to affect an affirmative duty and right 
which was distinctly federal in nature and purpose. In fact, this principle 
has subsequently guided the Supreme Court in decisions regarding the 
application of federal common law where the federal government is a 
litigant, most notably in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. 53 
                                                                                                             
 45 Id. at 366-67 (citations omitted). 
 46 See id. at 367. 
 47 Id. at 367 (emphasis added). 
 48 Id. 
 49 See FEDERAL COURTS at 751 n.2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 262 (2006)). 
 50 See Clearfield Trust Co., 318 U.S. at 366. 
 51 Id. at 366. 
 52 See id. at 366-67. 
 53 440 U.S. 715 (1979). 
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In Kimbell Foods, two actions filed in two different states (Texas 
and Georgia) by the SBA and FHA were on appeal to the Supreme 
Court. The Texas action concerned whether priority should have been 
given to an SBA commercial lien over that of a private creditor’s 
(Kimbell’s) lien even though the SBA’s lien was perfected subsequent to 
Kimbell’s.54 Though both liens were perfected in accordance with Texas 
law, the SBA argued the “choate lien rule” applied under federal 
common law over Texas law giving priority to their lien since Kimbell’s 
lien interest was not sufficiently specific to allow them “first in time” 
status.55 The Georgia action involved an FHA lien issued to secure a 
tractor that was subsequently acquired by a repairman through Georgia 
law after the tractor owner could not pay for repairs made by the 
repairman.56 In the recovery suit filed by the FHA against the repairman, 
the District Court found Georgia law to be applicable giving priority 
interest to the repairman.57 On appeal, although the Court of Appeals 
ruled against the FHA, it held federal common law to be applicable to the 
circumstances of the case and devised a special rule derived from the 
Uniform Commercial Code to award the tractor to the repairman.58 
While the Supreme Court found the authority of the SBA and FHA 
to be derived from a federal source consistent with the factors in 
Clearfield Trust,59 it did not find that the uncertainties resulting from the 
“application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of [their] 
federal programs” enough to adopt a uniform federal rule.60 Relying on 
precedent from United States v. Yazell,61 the Supreme Court held: 
Because SBA operations were “specifically and in great detail 
adapted to state law,” the federal interest in supplanting 
“important and carefully evolved state arrangements designed to 
serve multiple purposes” was minimal. Our conclusion [in 
Yazell] that compliance with state law would produce no 
hardship on the agency was also based on the SBA’s practice of 
“individually [negotiating] in painfully particularized detail” each 
loan transaction. These observations apply with equal force here 
and compel us again to reject generalized pleas for uniformity as 
                                                                                                             
 54 Id. at 720. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 723. 
 57 Id. at 724. 
 58 Id. at 724-25. 
 59 Id. at 726-27. 
 60 Id. at 728. 
 61 382 U.S. 341 (1966). 
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substitutes for concrete evidence that adopting state law would 
adversely affect administration of the federal programs.62 
Since the FHA regulations also incorporated state law in a manner 
similar to the SBA, the same logic also precluded the application of a 
uniform rule to their action.63 
The Court further ruled: 
Because the ultimate consequences of altering settled 
commercial practices are so difficult to foresee, we hesitate to 
create new uncertainties, in the absence of careful legislative 
deliberation. Of course, formulating special rules to govern the 
priority of the federal consensual liens in issue here would be 
justified if necessary to vindicate important national interests. 
But neither the Government nor the Court of Appeals advanced 
any concrete reasons for rejecting well-established commercial 
rules which have proven workable over time. Thus, the prudent 
course is to adopt the readymade body of state law as the federal 
rule of decision until Congress strikes a different 
accommodation.64 
The level of uncertainty in outcome that could frustrate uniformity 
adversely affecting a federal interest which in turn would warrant the 
application of a federal common law rule was clarified by Kimbel Foods. 
The Court in Kimbell Foods appeared to establish a vague guideline. 
Even though authority from a federal source may be found65 and 
uniformity in outcome may lead to uncertainty in result, these factors 
alone will not necessitate displacing state law in favor of a uniform 
federal rule.66 The degree to which a federal interest is frustrated must 
also be considered and weighed against a state’s reliance upon the law in 
question.67 In Kimbell Foods, both the SBA and FHA anticipated the 
applicability of state law to their lending programs and conformed their 
programs to these expectations68 indicating that the federal programs 
would not necessarily be disturbed absent a uniform rule. In light of 
these factors, the Court appeared more concerned with how a uniform 
                                                                                                             
 62 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 729-30 (1979) (citations 
omitted). 
 63 See id. at 730-31. 
 64 Id. at. 739-40 (emphasis added). 
 65 See id. 
 66 See id. at 727-28. 
 67 See id. at 728 (“Apart from considerations of uniformity, we must also determine 
whether application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal 
programs.”). 
 68 See id. 
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federal rule would alter “settled commercial practices”69 established 
around state law. Consequently, displacement should only occur when 
“specific objectives” of a federal law or a federal purpose are frustrated.70 
Arguably, the Court’s decision reveals that with regard to 
uniformity, a two pronged analysis is necessary. First, a court should 
consider to what level the state law being displaced by a uniform federal 
rule is relied upon. In the commercial context, Kimbell Foods shows that 
if state commercial law is well settled and generally relied upon, 
indicating an anticipation that state law will apply to a particular 
transaction, a uniform federal rule is likely not appropriate. Second, if a 
state’s reliance on the law is considerably frustrated by adoption of a 
uniform rule, a court should consider to what level that reliance is 
frustrated if a uniform federal rule is adopted. Reiterating the Court’s 
position in Kimbell Foods, if the “ultimate consequences of altering 
settled commercial practices are . . .  difficult to foresee,”71 then a 
uniform rule displacing state law is not suitable. 
It is important to note that an interesting dilemma does surface in 
light of both Clearfield Trust and Kimbell Foods with respect to the twin 
dangers of federalism and separation of powers issues implicated from 
the application of federal judge-made law. In Clearfield Trust, the Court 
finds the circumstances compelling enough to warrant adoption of a 
uniform federal rule so as not to frustrate an important federal function 
regardless of whether significant state law would be displaced. However, 
little consideration is given to whether the judiciary, as a lawmaker, is 
competent to fashion the uniform rule necessary to achieve the specific 
federal purpose invoking some separation of powers concern. Similarly, 
the Court in Kimbell Foods also seems overly concerned with how state 
law, with regard to commercial expectations, would be frustrated by 
adoption of a federal rule. The Court does not delve deeply into whether 
a federal court is authorized to create such a rule (probably because it did 
not need to reach the issue); although it did note that “formulating special 
rules to govern . . . here would be justified if necessary to vindicate 
important national interests” perhaps indicating if compelling federal 
interests did exist, as they did in Clearfield Trust, displacing even settled 
state law could be appropriate.72 
Both cases seem to suggest that if the federal interest or function in 
question is significantly frustrated, the balance is tilted considerably in 
favor of adopting a judicial rule of law. The problem left unanswered by 
                                                                                                             
 69 Id. at 739-40. 
 70 Id. at 728. 
 71 Id. at 739. 
 72 Id. at 740 (emphasis added). 
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the Supreme Court, as alluded to previously, is whether the “interstitial 
lawmaking”73 of a federal judge is sufficiently weighed against the 
federal legislature’s authority, interest and competence to address the 
conflict. However, it is possible to construe the Supreme Court’s lack of 
consideration for the separation of powers issue in another manner; and 
that is, when the frustration of the federal interest or function is so 
egregious that it would severely hinder an essential or central federal 
purpose unnecessarily subjugating the federal government to the 
uncertainty of state law, as was the case in Clearfield Trust. The urgency 
and need for implementing a rule of law to adequately dispose of an 
issue in favor of the federal government will always outweigh any 
separation of powers considerations. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
a legislature’s ability to act to displace or rectify judge-made law is not 
affected in any way by the adoption of a uniform rule as federal common 
law. 
Regardless of these Constitutional concerns, the lessons to be 
drawn from Clearfield Trust and Kimbell Foods in analyzing the 
application of federal common law to the ancillary proceedings of the 
SEC appointed receiver is to focus on the nature of a commercial 
transaction and the state laws applicable to that transaction. This will 
play an important role in determining whether adopting a uniform rule 
under federal common law is proper when considering the fraudulent 
transfer made as part of the Ponzi scheme. 
2. Private Litigants 
It is well settled that the substantive application of federal common 
law to displace state law is not limited only to cases where the federal 
government is a litigant.74 However, considerable confusion remains as 
to what circumstances must exist in order to adopt a rule of federal 
common law in actions between private parties. The Supreme Court’s 
development of federal common law in litigation involving private 
litigants has seemingly been inconsistent.75 In fact, commentators have 
observed “some [Supreme Court] cases suggest that the federal interest 
may be less immediately implicated in litigation to which the United 
States is not a party,”76 while other cases have allowed the adoption of 
federal common law among private litigants where the federal interest 
                                                                                                             
 73 See Clark, supra note 16, at 1287. 
 74 See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988); Hinderlider v. La 
Plata River, 304 U.S. 92 (1938).  
 75 See cases cited supra note 3. 
 76 FEDERAL COURTS at 764 (discussing Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 
Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956). 
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was ostensibly just as tenuous.77 Nevertheless, the controlling principle 
behind the adoption of federal common law to displace state law in these 
cases has been whether there will be a direct effect upon an identifiable 
federal interest or function in the absence of such adoption having the 
consequence of frustrating a specific federal objective or creating a 
significant conflict with federal law.78 
Perhaps the most significant Supreme Court case dealing with the 
substantive application of federal common law between private litigants 
which may provide some guidance for private litigation in ancillary 
proceedings where federal interests are implicated is Boyle v. United 
Technologies Corp.79 In Boyle, the father of a Marine helicopter pilot 
brought a defective repair and negligent manufacture claim against the 
independent defense contractor who designed the helicopter flown by the 
pilot.80 The pilot perished in a crash alleged to have been the result of 
negligent repair flaws and design defects which prevented his timely 
escape after the helicopter went down.81 At issue was whether a “military 
contractor defense” could be asserted by the contractor under federal 
common law to preclude the father’s recovery under his state law claim 
since the contractor designed the helicopter in accordance with a contract 
entered into with the United States.82 
The Court concluded two areas of “uniquely federal interest[]”83 
were involved. First, the Court recognized that the obligations of the 
United States under contract were governed exclusively by federal law.84 
While the case at hand did not involve the obligations of the United 
States under contract, but rather the liability to third persons, the liability 
nevertheless arose from performance of a federal contract.85 Second, the 
Court acknowledged that the “civil liability of federal officials for 
actions taken in the course of their duty”86 was, in many instances, 
controlled by federal law.87 Analogizing from Yearsley v. W.A. Ross 
Const. Co.,88 an earlier decided case in which a private landowner was 
                                                                                                             
 77 See, e.g., Boyle, 487 U.S. 500. 
 78 Compare Bank of Am., 352 U.S. 29, and Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 
(1977), with Boyle, 487 U.S. 500. 
 79 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
 80 Id. at 502. 
 81 Id. at 503. 
 82 Id. at 504. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 504-05. 
 85 See id. at 505. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 309 U.S. 18 (1940). 
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precluded from holding a private contractor liable under state law for 
building dikes for the federal government, the Court reasoned: 
“[I]f [the] authority to carry out the project was validly conferred, 
that is, if what was done was within the constitutional power of 
Congress, there is no liability on the part of the contractor for 
executing its will.” The federal interest justifying this holding 
surely exists as much in procurement contracts as in performance 
contracts; we see no basis for a distinction.89 
The Court went on to distinguish Boyle from other previously 
decided cases involving private litigants where the “‘federal interest in 
the outcome of the [dispute] before . . . [was] far too speculative, far too 
remote a possibility to justify the application of federal law. . . .’”90 
Instead, Boyle involved a case where the circumstances would have a 
more direct effect.91 The Court extrapolated: 
The imposition of liability on Government contractors will 
directly affect the terms of Government contracts: either the 
contractor will decline to manufacture the design specified by the 
Government, or it will raise its price. Either way, the interests of 
the United States will be directly affected.92 
Therefore, the federal objective implicated was not too attenuated or 
speculative.93 
                                                                                                             
 89 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 506 (quoting Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 20-21) (second alteration in 
original). 
 90 Id. (quoting Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1977). 
 91 See id. 
 92 Id. at 507. 
 93 Boyle was decided by a divided court (5-4) that disagreed strongly on whether the 
facts of Boyle were necessarily distinguishable from past cases involving the 
displacement of state law by federal common law among private litigants. Justice 
Brennan keenly observed there was no distinction in the present case from past cases: 
  In Miree v. DeKalb County, for example, the county was contractually 
obligated under a grant agreement with the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) to “restrict the use of land adjacent to . . . the Airport to activities and 
purposes compatible with normal airport operations including landing and 
takeoff of aircraft.” At issue was whether the county breached its contractual 
obligation by operating a garbage dump adjacent to the airport, which 
allegedly attracted the swarm of birds that caused a plane crash. Federal 
common law would undoubtedly have controlled in any suit by the Federal 
Government to enforce the provision against the county or to collect 
damages for its violation. The diversity suit, however, was brought not by 
the Government, but by assorted private parties injured in some way by the 
accident. We observed that “the operations of the United States in 
connection with FAA grants such as these are undoubtedly of considerable 
magnitude,’ and that ‘the United States has a substantial interest in 
regulating aircraft travel and promoting air travel safety.” Nevertheless, we 
held that state law should govern the claim because “only the rights of 
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Having concluded that a “uniquely federal interest” existed, the 
Court then turned to Kimbell Foods second criterion for determining 
whether to displace settled state law, namely, gauging whether a 
“significant conflict” between the identified federal interest or related 
federal legislation would result if state law were applied94 or whether 
“application of state law would ‘frustrate specific objectives’ of federal 
legislation.”95 Ultimately the Court found that allowing a state law claim 
to proceed would in fact disrupt an exception to the Federal Tort Claims 
Act which precluded claims “based upon the exercise or performance or 
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the 
part of a federal agency . . . whether or not the discretion involved be 
abused.”96 The Court concluded: 
  We think that the selection of the appropriate design for 
military equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly 
a discretionary function within the meaning of this provision. It 
often involves not merely engineering analysis but judgment as 
to the balancing of many technical, military, and even social 
considerations, including specifically the trade-off between 
greater safety and greater combat effectiveness. And we are 
further of the view that permitting “second-guessing” of these 
judgments through state tort suits against contractors would 
produce the same effect sought to be avoided by the FTCA 
exemption. The financial burden of judgments against the 
contractors would ultimately be passed through, substantially if 
not totally, to the United States itself, since defense contractors 
will predictably raise their prices to cover, or to insure against, 
contingent liability for the Government-ordered designs. To put 
                                                                                                             
private litigants are at issue here,” and the claim against the county “will 
have no direct effect upon the United States or its Treasury.” 
[The Court then discussed other cases involving private litigants] 
. . . 
 Here, as in Miree . . . a Government contract governed by federal 
common law looms in the background. But here, too, the United States is 
not a party to the suit and the suit neither “touch[es] the rights and duties of 
the United States,” nor has a ‘direct effect upon the United States or its 
Treasury,’ The relationship at issue is at best collateral to the Government 
contract. We have no greater power to displace state law governing the 
collateral relationship in the Government procurement realm than we had to 
dictate federal rules governing equally collateral relationships in the areas of 
aviation, Government-issued commercial paper, or federal lands. 
Boyle v. United Techs. Corp, 487 U.S. 500, 519-21 (1988) (Brennan J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 94 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 
68 (1966)). 
 95 Id. (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979)). 
 96 Id. at 511 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006)). 
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the point differently: It makes little sense to insulate the 
Government against financial liability for the judgment that a 
particular feature of military equipment is necessary when the 
Government produces the equipment itself, but not when it 
contracts for the production. In sum, we are of the view that state 
law which holds Government contractors liable for design defects 
in military equipment does in some circumstances present a 
‘significant conflict’ with federal policy and must be displaced.97 
B. Post-Erie Developments of Federal Common Law and Their 
Potential Applicability in the Ancillary Disgorgement Proceedings of the 
SEC Appointed Receiver 
Though the party claiming the benefit of the federal common law 
rule in Boyle was a private litigant, the Supreme Court was not prevented 
from finding a uniquely federal interest. The principle that a private 
litigant cannot be prevented from invoking a rule of federal common law 
will be helpful to the SEC appointed receiver who is necessarily a private 
litigant. More importantly, Clearfield Trust and Kimbell Foods both 
establish that where the source of authority of the party claiming the 
benefit of the federal rule is derived from a federal source of law, the 
need for adopting a uniform rule may be warranted. This establishes the 
first criteria for federal common law analysis. This criteria will be 
important to the SEC appointed receiver whose authority is arguably 
derived from the Securities and Exchanges Acts.98 
While a federal interest may be implicated, the inquiry does not 
stop there. According to the law of Boyle and Kimbell Foods taken 
together, before adoption of the federal rule, it appears the court must 
consider whether the federal interest or purpose will be directly affected. 
A consequence that is too remote or speculative on the interest appears 
not be sufficient to warrant adoption of a uniform federal rule. 
Furthermore, significant conflict between the displaced state law and the 
identified federal interest must exist or it must be shown that 
displacement of the state law is necessary to avoid frustration of the 
federal interest. This analysis sets up the second criteria for federal 
common law analysis. For the SEC appointed receiver, conflict between 
state law and the goals and purposes of the Securities and Exchanges 
Acts will be at issue when considering the displacement of state 
fraudulent conveyance law or state veil-piercing doctrines. 
                                                                                                             
 97 Id. at 511-12. 
 98 See discussion infra Part II. 
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It should be noted that the Supreme Court’s analysis in these cases 
take the federalism issues into consideration, but does little to quell the 
separation of powers concerns associated with the implementation of 
judge-made law.99 The competency of the judiciary to act as a quasi-
legislature is rightly questioned when considering the adoption of a 
uniform rule of federal common law. Though the Supreme Court has 
ruled that a federal interest can be compelling enough to displace state 
law overriding federalism concerns, as was the case in Clearfield Trust 
and Boyle, the authority and competence of the judiciary to create 
uniform rules to affect federal interests signals a dilemma with separation 
of powers which has not been thoroughly addressed by the Supreme 
Court. 
Arguably, the Supreme Court’s relatively minimal consideration of 
this issue was in cases where the frustration of the federal interests or 
functions were so egregious that they would have severely hindered 
essential or central federal purposes unnecessarily subjugating the federal 
government to the uncertainty of state law, as was the case in Clearfield 
Trust; or they were cases which would allow for the “second-
guessing”100 of intrinsically federal discretionary powers, as was the case 
in Boyle. The urgency and need for implementing a rule of law to 
adequately dispose of conflicts issues in favor of the federal government 
where such integral federal interests were implicated may have 
outweighed any separation of powers considerations. Furthermore, as 
mentioned earlier, Congress’s ability to act to displace or rectify judge-
made law is not affected in any way by the adoption of a uniform rule of 
federal common law. 
                                                                                                             
 99 This was indeed a deeply disturbing fact for Justice Stevens, who dissented in 
Boyle: 
  When judges are asked to embark on a lawmaking venture, I believe they 
should carefully consider whether they, or a legislative body, are better 
equipped to perform the task at hand. There are instances of so-called 
interstitial lawmaking that inevitably become part of the judicial process. 
But when we are asked to create an entirely new doctrine—to answer 
“questions of policy on which Congress has not spoken,”—we have a 
special duty to identify the proper decisionmaker before trying to make the 
proper decision. 
 When the novel question of policy involves a balancing of the 
conflicting interests in the efficient operation of a massive governmental 
program and the protection of the rights of the individual—whether in the 
social welfare context, the civil service context, or the military procurement 
context—I feel very deeply that we should defer to the expertise of the 
Congress. 
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 531-32 (1988) (Stevens J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 100 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. 
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The adoption of a uniform rule under federal common law to 
displace state fraudulent conveyance law is similarly one of compelling 
federal concerns to the SEC appointed receiver. As discussion in the next 
part will show, the application of different state fraudulent conveyance 
laws to the disgorgement proceedings will severely frustrate the impetus 
behind the Securities and Exchanges Acts to protect unsophisticated 
investors. The need to adopt a uniform fraudulent conveyance rule in 
such proceedings implicates no real frustration or binding obligation on 
state law and is in fact irrelevant to a state’s reliance on fraudulent 
conveyance law, which is primarily a law applicable in the bankruptcy 
context. Furthermore, adoption of different state veil-piercing doctrines 
over a federal veil-piercing standard to reach majority shareholders of 
offshore entities investing in Ponzi schemes creates a significant conflict 
with the goals of the 1933 and 1934 Acts if the corporate veils of such 
entities are not pierced. The next part will show that the frustration of 
these federal purposes by adoption of state law create the compelling 
circumstances necessary to adopt a uniform rule of federal common law. 
II. FEDERAL COMMON LAW IN THE DISGORGEMENT PROCEEDINGS OF 
SEC APPOINTED RECEIVERS 
A. Ponzi Schemes and the Appointment of Receiverships 
1. The Ponzi Scheme as a Violation of the Securities and Exchange 
Acts 
In order for a Ponzi Scheme101 to violate the Securities and 
Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934, the Ponzi scheme must first satisfy 
section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act. The 1933 and 1934 Acts only govern 
                                                                                                             
 101 Ponzi schemes take their name from Charles Ponzi, whose scheme led him to the 
Supreme Court in 1924. Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924). Today, the term 
“Ponzi scheme” is used to describe an investment scheme that is not backed by a 
legitimate business venture wherein investors are paid profits from the principal sums of 
newly attracted investors. The type of Ponzi scheme that this paper will deal with exists 
when the perpetrator of the scheme creates one or more corporations through which he or 
she lures investors into fictional business ventures. The main source of income for these 
“dummy” corporations is the acquisition of new funds from investors, lured into the 
scheme through promises of high returns on their investments, which are then paid to 
older investors as “profit.” See generally In re Bullion Reserve of N. Am., 836 F.2d 
1214, 1218 n.8 (9th Cir. 1988)); Rodriguez v. Dunson (In re Rodriguez), 209 B.R. 424, 
431 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (citing In re United Energy Corp., 944 F.2d 589, 590 n.1 (9th Cir. 
1991)); Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent and Preferential 
Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157 (1998). A good example of a modern Ponzi scheme 
dealt with in this paper is found in Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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what can be defined as “securities.”102 The Supreme Court has read 
section 2(a)(1) liberally, saying that Congress defined “security” so 
broadly that it may encompass virtually any instrument that might be 
sold as an investment.103 Whether or not a transaction falls within the 
meaning of a security is based on the economic realities involved in the 
transaction.104 
The Securities Act, for purposes of characterization of a Ponzi 
scheme, partially defines an “investment contract” as a security.105 The 
term “investment contract” is defined as any “contract, transaction, or 
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and 
is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of a promoter or third party 
. . . .”106  The well-known Howey test delineates a three part standard for 
purposes of determining whether a transaction falls within the SEC’s 
interpretation of an investment contract. This standard shows that in 
order for an “investment contract” to be deemed a security the 
transaction must include (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common 
enterprise with (3) the expectation of profits produced by the efforts of 
others.107 
The typical Ponzi scheme requires the investment of money.108 
Therefore, the first prong of the Howey test is satisfied. Second, investors 
in the Ponzi scheme usually invest their money into a single entity, 
usually a fictional corporation established by the operators of the 
scheme. As a result, investments can be seen as becoming part of a 
common enterprise in conformance with the second prong of the Howey 
test.109 Ponzi schemes lure investors through promises of high returns on 
investments through the efforts of the scheme operators. Restated, 
investments are made in the scheme, generally by average and 
unsophisticated investors, solely for the high rate of promised returns 
coming from the “investment” efforts of the scheme operators through 
                                                                                                             
 102 See Securities Exchange Act of 1933, § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77a et. seq. (2006). 
 103 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60 (1990). 
 104 Tcherepin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). 
 105 See Securities Exchange Act of 1933, § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77a et. seq. (2006). 
 106 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). 
 107 Id. at 299. 
 108 See Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 109 A typical Ponzi scheme involves this “horizontal commonality” or pooling of 
investments. Using the Scholes example, the money raised through new investor funds 
was used predominantly to pay existing investors; money was constantly pooled and 
dolled out to pay older investor’s their promised return of ten to twenty percent of their 
investments. Scholes, 56 F.3d at 752. 
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their managing of the fictional entity.110 Therefore, in a typical Ponzi 
scheme, the three criteria delineated in Howey are met. 
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, section 10 of the 1934 Act, and Rule 
10(b)(5) encompass the basic anti-fraud provisions of the Acts applicable 
against the perpetrator or perpetrators of a Ponzi Scheme.111 These 
provisions all prohibit fraudulent conduct or practices in connection with 
the offer or sale of securities.112 In order to be liable for securities fraud, 
the accused must have “(1) made a material misrepresentation or a 
material omission as to which he had a duty to speak, or used a 
fraudulent device; (2) with scienter; (3) in connection with the purchase 
or sale of securities.”113 A showing of scienter is an element of an 
enforcement action pursuant to the antifraud provisions of the Securities 
Acts.114 Scienter is “the mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud.”115 Intent on the part of the perpetrator of the 
alleged Ponzi scheme, or the perpetrator as an agent for the corporation 
heading the scheme, is required in order to enforce any of these 
provisions of the Acts.116 
2. The Appointment of a Receiver and the Disgorgement of 
Fraudulent Transfers 
Since the promised rates of return in a Ponzi scheme are always in 
excess of any real investment and creditors are unable to be paid by 
nature of the scheme’s structure, a “Ponzi corporation” is deemed to be 
                                                                                                             
 110 In Scholes, investors were solicited solely through the promise of return on their 
investments and invested so that they could see the promised ten to twenty percent per 
month return on their investment. Scholes, 56 F.3d at 752. 
 111 Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act makes it unlawful for any person through the use of 
interstate commerce to (1) “employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” or to (2) 
“obtain money or property by means of an untrue statement of material fact or any 
omission to state a material fact,” or to (3) “engage in any transaction, practice, or course 
of business which operates, or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.”  
 112 Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act is a broad rule that makes unlawful any deceptive 
device used or employed through interstate commerce or in contravention of such rules as 
the Commission may prescribe. Rule 10b-5 mirrors § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, but also 
broadens the regulatory scope in that it omits obtaining money or property from part 2 of 
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and states that any untrue statement of material fact or 
omission is unlawful regardless of whether the statement is made or not made upon 
obtaining money or property. Furthermore, it makes it unlawful to engage in any 
fraudulent or deceitful act upon any person, not just the purchaser of the security in 
question. 
 113 E.g., SEC v. Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F. 3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 114 E.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980). 
 115 E.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). 
 116 Aaron, 446 U.S. at 701-02. 
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effectively insolvent from its inception.117 A federal court, in dealing 
with the assets of an insolvent Ponzi corporation, may appoint a receiver 
to marshal and collect misappropriated funds in order to redistribute 
those funds to creditors and defrauded investors. The legal fiction is that 
the receiver acts on behalf of the corporation and not the investors in the 
scheme because the Ponzi corporation is considered to be a “legal 
entit[y] separate from principal and injured by [fraudulent] transfers.”118 
The fraudulent transfers are the fictitious “profit” distributions paid to 
old investors from new investor funds. The appointment of a receiver 
takes the corporation and its assets out of the hands of the wrongdoer and 
places them in the hands of the receiver.119 
The receiver may bring actions based on law or equity in any state, 
federal, or foreign court to recover fraudulent conveyances made as part 
of the scheme.120 A receiver is generally appointed in the jurisdiction 
where the SEC brings action against the operators of the scheme. In 
actions brought in federal court, the federal court maintains ancillary or 
pendent jurisdiction over any claims filed by the receiver to disgorge 
fraudulent transfers.121 Because the Ponzi corporation is not considered 
bankrupt under the meaning of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the receiver 
proceeds to disgorge fraudulent transfers under the applicable state 
fraudulent conveyance law as opposed to federal fraudulent conveyance 
law.122 
Receiverships in Ponzi scheme situations allow defrauded investors 
to obtain redress efficiently through the receiverships power. A receiver 
in a typical Ponzi scheme proceeding of securities fraud seeks out and 
recovers the corporation’s misappropriated assets, used and acquired as a 
result of the scheme, in order to redistribute them among defrauded 
investors involved in the scheme. Similar to a trustee in bankruptcy, a 
receiver may only sue to redress injuries to the entity in receivership.123 
                                                                                                             
 117 In re Taubman, 160 B.R. 964, 978 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993); see also Rodriguez v. 
Dunson (In re Rodriguez), 209 B.R. 424, 432 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1997) (citing Merrill v. 
Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House Co.), 77 B.R. 843, 871 (Bankr. D. Utah 1987) (also 
stating that Ponzi schemes “become[] increasingly insolvent as the scheme progresses.”)). 
 118 See Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 119 See McCandless v. Furland, 296 U.S. 140, 159-61 (1935). 
 120 28 U.S.C § 754 (2006). This statute allows a receiver to sue in the district where he 
was appointed in order to enforce claims anywhere in the country. 
 121 See, e.g., United States v. Franklin Nat’l Bank, 512 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(“The ancillary suit is cognizable in the main suit regardless of the citizenship of the 
parties or the amount in controversy because the res over which the receiver took control 
is already before the court.”); Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1350 (2d Cir. 
1974); Tcherepnin v. Franz, 485 F.2d 1251, 1255-56 (7th Cir. 1973); Esbitt v. Dutch-Am. 
Mercantile Corp., 335 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1964). 
 122 See generally Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 123 Id. at 753. 
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The receiver’s job is to maximize the value of the Ponzi corporation, 
ultimately for the benefit of the corporation’s defrauded investors and 
creditors.124 Stated in other terms, the receiver’s goal is to maximize the 
recovery of funds invested in the scheme so that they may be returned in 
some degree to the wronged investors. 
B. The Receiver’s Choice of Law Problems 
The greatest obstacle for a receiver to overcome in disgorging 
fraudulent transfers made to investors is resolving the extraordinary 
number of conflicts of law issues which arise during litigation.125 As 
discussed earlier, the receiver must bring actions against individual 
investors under state fraudulent conveyance law in federal court through 
the federal court’s pendant or ancillary jurisdiction over the federal 
claims against the operators of the Ponzi scheme.126 Therefore, the first 
conflict of law issue to decide is under which state fraudulent 
conveyance law the receiver should proceed. Depending on whom the 
action is brought against and which jurisdiction the investor resides in, 
this can be a daunting task as the ensuing discussion shows. 
Often times, the lucrative nature of a Ponzi scheme will attract the 
more sophisticated investor with its high promised rates of return. These 
investors often invest as single shareholders of offshore entities. 
Sometimes, as is often the case, these investors can be indirect insiders to 
the general scheme.127 The shareholder investing on behalf of her wholly 
owned offshore corporation and receiving distributions under the name 
of the offshore corporation is particularly troublesome and can give rise 
to numerous conflicts issues. Ideally, the appropriate measure to take in 
such a circumstance would be to pierce the veil of the offshore 
corporation in order to reach the domestic single or majority shareholder 
receiving contributions from the scheme in a U.S. federal court. 
However, the divergence of veil-piercing doctrines from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction may impede the possibility of such an action or may shift a 
heavier burden of proof on the receiver extending the amount of time in 
litigation and cost of litigation.128 
                                                                                                             
 124 Id. at 754. 
 125 See generally Terry v. June, 359 F. Supp. 2d 510 (W.D. Va. 2005). 
 126 See discussion supra Part I. 
 127 The receiver in Terry was confronted with many such entities. For example, the 
son of Robert June, Sr., the defendant in Terry, was an employee of Dowdell who 
managed his father’s investments. He also operated several dummy corporations which 
received funds from Dowdell’s general scheme. See Terry, 359 F. Supp. 2d 510; see also 
discussion, infra. 
 128 For example, in determining whether the veil should be pierced, Michigan 
considers if: (1) the corporation and shareholders have a complete identity of interests; 
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Using the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning from Bryan v. Bartlett as 
adopted by the Western District of Virginia in Terry v. June,129 this 
section will also show how a uniform federal veil-piercing doctrine and a 
uniform fraudulent conveyance rule can be applied under federal 
common law in these circumstances to displace conflicting state laws. 
1. The Problem with Determining Which Fraudulent Conveyance 
Law Applies 
For conflicts of law purposes it is important to first characterize the 
nature of the legal issue.130 Generally, for purposes of determining 
conflicts of law, many federal courts have characterized fraudulent 
conveyances as torts.131 While some courts have held otherwise,132 a 
                                                                                                             
(2) the corporation is a mere instrumentality of the shareholders; (3) the corporation is a 
device to avoid legal obligation or; (4) the corporation is used to defeat public 
convenience, justify a wrong, protect fraud or defend a crime.  Bodenhamer Bldg. Corp. 
v. Architectural Research Corp., 873 F.2d 109, 112 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Kline v. Kline, 
205 N.W.2d 297 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Williams v. Am. Title Ins. Co., 269 N.W.2d 481 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1978)). A finding of any one will warrant piercing. On the other hand, 
Delaware may look to a combination of multiple factors under an “alter ego” theory 
“when such matters as fraud, contravention of law or contract, public wrong, or where 
equitable considerations among members of the corporation require it, are involved.” 
Harco Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Green Farms, Inc., No. 1131, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 114, *11-12 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 1989) (quoting Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. Cont’l Oil Co., 239 A.2d 
629 (Del. 1968)). The standard appears to be more rigid and requires a heavier burden of 
proof than the Michigan doctrine. 
 129 359 F. Supp. 2d 510 (W.D. Va. 2005). 
 130 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 (1971). 
 131 See, e.g., Midlantic Bank, N.A. v. Strong, No. 94-CV-4901-SJ, 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22384, *21-22 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1996); Elgin Sweeper Co. v. Melson, Inc., 884 
F. Supp. 641, 650 n.12 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); Kaliner v. Load Rite Trailers (In re Sverica 
Acquisition Corp.), 179 B.R. 457, 469-470 (Bankr. E.D. Pa., 1995)(“[W]e believe that a 
fraudulent conveyance is more akin to a tort than a contract . . .”); Ferrari v. Barclays 
Bus. Credit, Inc. (In re Morse Tool), 108 B.R. 384, 387 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (stating 
underlying basis of fraudulent conveyance action not necessarily contractual); Hassett v. 
Far West Sav. & Loan Assoc. (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 40 B.R. 380, 391-95 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d on other grounds, 44 B.R. 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (deeming 
a fraudulent conveyance a tort in selecting applicable conflict of law principles); In re 
Penn Packing Co., 42 B.R. 502, 505 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (stating fraudulent 
conveyance act claim a tort for purposes of choosing Pennsylvania statute of limitations); 
Kidde Indus. v. Weaver Corp., No. 11683, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 
1994) (“Although not technically a fraud claim, fraudulent conveyance actions are based 
at least to some degree on fraud.”); LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 185 at 380 n.6 
(3d ed. 1977) (approving “tort characterization” in determining “law governing validity 
of allegedly fraudulent or preferential transfers and assignments.”); Ehrenzweig & 
Westen, Fraudulent Conveyances in the Conflict of Laws: Easy Cases May Make Bad 
Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1679, 1689 (1968) (“[T]he conflicts law of torts . . . controls . . . 
fraudulent conveyances.”); Comment, Choice of Law in Fraudulent Conveyance, 67 
COLUM. L. REV. 1313, 1314 (1967) (“[T]he central issue [in determining choice of law] 
can be most meaningfully described not as one of property law, but as one of tort law.”). 
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strong argument in favor of classifying fraudulent conveyances as torts 
committed against the Ponzi corporation is that the nature of the scheme 
itself warrants such an interpretation. When investors receive 
distributions in excess of their contribution, the corporation becomes 
increasingly insolvent. 133 In fact, the corporation is insolvent the moment 
the distribution is made.134 Each transfer made to an investor in excess of 
their contribution effectively depletes the assets of the Ponzi 
corporation.135 Therefore, it can be argued that each distribution accepted 
and retained by an investor amounts to a tort against the Ponzi 
corporation contributing to its insolvency. 
This argument may be successful in establishing that a tort has been 
committed against the Ponzi corporation and that an investor should be 
held liable. However, the matter of where the tort has occurred still 
remains unresolved. For resolving conflicts of law questions, this is the 
essential issue. Determining where the tort has occurred may determine 
which state’s fraudulent conveyance law is to be applied. Of course, this 
analysis is easier stated than done. 
To begin with, in diversity actions a federal court must apply the 
conflicts laws of the state in which it sits.136 While the federal court’s 
jurisdiction over the receiver’s claim is ancillary to the federal question 
claim against the Ponzi scheme operators and is not a diversity action, 
the receiver’s fraudulent conveyance actions will be exclusively state law 
claims.137 Therefore, it can be argued that the conflicts laws of the forum 
state should be applied as in diversity actions brought under state law.138 
This approach presents the most practical and outcome determinative 
                                                                                                             
 132 See, e.g., United States v. Neidorf, 522 F.2d 916, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding 
liability of transferee of a fraudulent conveyance is based not upon tort but upon quasi-
contract); Desmond v. Moffie, 375 F.2d 742, 743 (1st Cir. 1967) (finding fraudulent 
conveyance claim under Massachusetts Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act not to be a 
tort for purposes of choosing appropriate statute of limitations); Branch v. FDIC, 825 F. 
Supp. 384 (D. Mass. 1993) (finding fraudulent conveyance claim not to be a tort claim 
for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act); FDIC v. Almodovar, 671 F. Supp. 851, 871 
(D.P.R. 1987) (finding fraudulent conveyance claim not to be a tort for purposes of 
choosing appropriate statute of limitations); United States v. Franklin Nat’l Bank, 376 F. 
Supp. 378, 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (“New York Debtor and Creditor Law, which adopts 
verbatim the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, does not confer upon the creditor a 
right of action in tort against the grantee.”). 
 133 Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 134 See id. 
 135 See id. 
 136 See, e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
 137 See Scholes, 56 F.3d at 753 (holding receiver may sue only to redress injuries to 
the entities in receivership). 
 138 This in fact was the argument adopted by the receiver in Terry. See Partial 
Summary Judgment Motion of Receiver, May 6, 2005, http://www.dowdell-
receivership.com /graphics/cv052_docket040.pdf. 
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solution to resolving which state’s conflicts principles should be applied 
in order to determine what state law is applicable. 
Naturally, the next step would be to apply the forum state’s 
conflicts principles to determine which state’s law governs. Most states 
have adopted either the “rational relationship” test under the 
Restatements139 or follow the well-settled principle of lex loci delicti, 
also known as the “place of the wrong” test.140 The “rational 
relationship” inquiry focuses on which state has the most significant 
relationship with the transaction, or the tort in the Ponzi scheme 
context.141 The principle of lex loci delicti requires the court to look into 
the last act necessary to complete the transaction or tort.142 For purposes 
of fraudulent conveyances, under both of these tests the court would be 
required to examine either how the conveyances came about or what the 
last act necessary to complete the tort of fraudulent conveyance was. 
Under this analysis, it appears the focus of inquiry in the Ponzi scheme 
context would be where the acts occurred which depleted the Ponzi 
corporations assets. This could mean either looking to where the 
investment contract was formed, what state or states the majority of the 
distributions to the investor were made in or from, or, if distributions 
were made by checks or wire transfers to investors, where the last acts 
necessary to complete those transactions occurred. 
Regardless of the approach taken, the analysis is unnecessarily 
protracted and fails to provide a predictable outcome from case to case. 
A strong position can be taken on each of the above mentioned 
possibilities for resolving conflicts of law disputes.143 This compounds 
problems for the receiver.  It results in the receiver being burdened with 
more litigation against the investor with respect to resolving these issues 
increasing time and cost. More importantly, there is no uniformity in 
outcome. Fraudulent conveyance diverges from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.144 The application of fraudulent conveyance law in one 
jurisdiction could conceivably allow an investor to keep her distributions 
while the law of another may require a similarly situated investor to 
                                                                                                             
 139 See, e.g., Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gifford, 434 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1983). 
 140 See, e.g., McMillan v. McMillan, 219 Va. 1127 (1979); Baise v. Warren, 158 Va. 
505 (1932). 
 141 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971). 
 142 See McMillan, 219 Va. at 1129; Baise, 158 Va. at 508. 
 143 In fact, the defendant in Terry successfully argued to a federal magistrate judge 
that Virginia law should apply to the action before the case was appealed by the receiver 
to the district court. Terry v. June, 359 F. Supp. 2d  510, 512 (W.D. Va. 2005). 
 144 Contrast Virginia fraudulent transfer law requiring the receiver to show “lack of 
valuable consideration” in order to void transfer as opposed to the UFTA approach which 
only requires a showing of insolvency when transfer is made. 
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disgorge. In essence, the receiver is faced with fresh choice of law issues 
in each new action brought against investors to disgorge distributions 
which can break either in favor of the investor or the receiver. In the end, 
the consequence is more time and money spent in recovering investor 
funds and depletion of the recovery which is to be redistributed back to 
investors who have lost their principle investment in the scheme. 
2. Problems with Piercing Offshore Entities 
The most traditional method of asset and liability protection has 
been the establishment of corporations, limited liability partnerships and 
limited liability companies.145 In particular, establishing such entities 
offshore in island nations such as the Bahamas or the Cayman Islands 
can provide a substantial form of asset and liability protection for the 
individual investor. Many sophisticated Ponzi investors who are indirect 
insiders to the scheme, knowing of the nature of the scheme and the 
scheme’s eventual demise, having tremendously benefited from its 
generous “profit” distributions, enter the scheme as single or majority 
shareholders of such entities in order to thwart litigation or, at the very 
least, make it costly and difficult to disgorge their ill-gotten gains. 
Establishing jurisdiction over offshore entities imposes a substantial 
barrier. Under U.S. law, the corporation or entity must be served in 
accordance with the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial 
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters.146 This 
assumes the offshore entity resides in a country that is a party to the 
treaty.147 The Convention requires “[t]he authority or judicial officer 
competent under the law of the State in which the documents originate” 
to forward copies of the document to the designated Central Authority in 
the country where the documents are to be served.148 Once delivered to 
the Central Authority, the Central Authority must approve that service 
has complied with the provisions of the Convention, and only then will it 
proceed to serve the documents.149 
This poses some major obstacles for the receiver. Process can take 
between three and six months to complete, placing an extraordinary time 
impediment on recovering investor funds. Fraudulent conveyance actions 
                                                                                                             
 145 Ritchie W. Taylor, Note, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: The “Estate Planning 
Tool of the Decade” or a Charlatan?, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 163, 165 (1998). 
 146 Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents 
in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 16 I.L.M. 1331 (1977) [hereinafter 
Hague Convention on Service Abroad]. 
 147 Currently the Hague Convention on Service Abroad is in force in these offshore 
nations: Bahamas, Barbados, St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
 148 Hague Convention on Service Abroad, ch. 1, art. 3 
 149 Id. ch. 1, art. 4 
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brought by the receiver are subject to a statute of limitations (generally 
two years) from the time of appointment. Discovering distributions made 
in excess of the principle invested and tracing transfers made to 
individual shareholders of such entities can take over a year, leaving the 
receiver with limited time to bring an action against such an entity. 
Furthermore, assuming service is accomplished, jurisdiction is found 
proper, and a judgment is attained, a federal court exercising ancillary 
jurisdiction may not retain jurisdiction to enforce the judgment.150 This 
may leave the receiver with having the judgment enforced against the 
individual or majority shareholder in either a state court in the state in 
which the investor resides, or in the foreign court of the country in which 
the entity is incorporated or formed. 
Such a result poses two practical problems. Under the first scenario, 
a state court will naturally adopt its own veil-piercing doctrine in order to 
determine whether the judgment can be enforced against an individual 
shareholder. Depending on the stringency of the veil-piercing doctrine, it 
will either prevent the receiver from piercing to reach the shareholder or 
may require the receiver to prove more facts which warrant piercing 
under the state’s doctrine, increasing the receiver’s time and cost of 
litigation. 
Under the second scenario, a foreign court may be reluctant to 
enforce a judgment entered in a non-native jurisdiction because it may be 
dissatisfied with the manner in which process is served or because of due 
process concerns.151 The principal of “territoriality” may also be 
cumbersome to overcome in enforcing any judgments obtained in the 
United States.152 One commentator remarked: 
                                                                                                             
 150 In Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349 (1996), the Supreme Court of the United 
States overruled the Fourth Circuit’s holding that a district court retained ancillary 
jurisdiction to enforce a judgment entered under an ERISA claim. The Court held: 
[C]laims alleged to be factually interdependent with and, hence, ancillary to 
claims brought in an earlier federal lawsuit will not support federal 
jurisdiction over a subsequent lawsuit. The basis of the doctrine of ancillary 
jurisdiction is the practical need “to protect legal rights or effectively to 
resolve an entire, logically entwined lawsuit.” But once judgment was 
entered in the original ERISA suit, the ability to resolve simultaneously 
factually intertwined issues vanished. . . . Neither the convenience of 
litigants nor considerations of judicial economy can justify the extension of 
ancillary jurisdiction over [a plaintiff’s] claims in [a] subsequent 
proceeding. 
Peacock, 516 U.S. at 355 (citation omitted). 
 151 For example, in the United Kingdom, by statute, foreign judgments which enforce 
both civil and criminal liability are severable and judgments awarding penalties or awards 
over compensatory damages are equally unenforceable. See ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN 
JUDGMENTS IN PERSONAM, c.157 (HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND). 
 152 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L. J. 1, 13 (1996). 
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As an initial matter, a judgment can be enforced only within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the court that entered it. To enforce 
against property in another [foreign] jurisdiction, the holder must 
establish its judgment in that jurisdiction. The ‘full faith and 
credit’ clause of the United States Constitution assures that a 
judgment of one state will be enforced in the courts of another; 
the principle merely requires formal proof of the existence and 
validity of the judgment. Foreign countries, however, may 
require that the underlying cause of action be relitigated. The 
United States is not yet party to any treaties for the enforcement 
of judgments [abroad]. 153 
C. Overcoming Conflicts of Law Issues Through Adoption of Federal 
Common Law 
Taking the Clearfield Trust, Kimbell Foods and Boyle cases into 
consideration in the SEC appointed receivership context, three major 
hurdles emerge for the SEC appointed receiver of a Ponzi corporation to 
overcome. First, the receiver must establish some source of federal 
authority for invoking a uniform federal rule. The Eighth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Bryan v. Bartlett is satisfying and in conformance with 
established law with respect to this factor. Next, a receiver must show 
that adoption of a uniform rule is necessary to affect a federal interest or 
purpose. Finally, the receiver must show that the displacement of state 
law will not raise the general concerns of federalism when federal 
common law is applied substantively. This analysis was not made in 
Bryan, most likely because adoption of a uniform federal fraudulent 
conveyance rule in the Ponzi receiver context, which was at issue in the 
case, was irrelevant to the ordinary transactions which state fraudulent 
conveyance laws normally address, and did not implicate the 
unforeseeable consequences mentioned in Kimbell Foods.154 However, 
this analysis may be important in adopting a uniform federal veil-
piercing doctrine over state law in a disgorgement proceeding dealing 
with a Ponzi investor investing as an offshore entity. 
1. The Concept of a Receiver Serving a Federal Interest and 
Function 
The proposition that a court-appointed receiver serves a federal 
interest is directly supported in Bryan v. Bartlett.155 In Bryan, the SEC 
sued a bank seeking to enjoin violations of the Securities Acts of 1933 
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 154 See supra discussion Part I.1. 
 155 435 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1970). 
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and 1934.156 The court entered a temporary injunction and appointed a 
federal equity receiver over the bank to protect defrauded investors.157 
The receiver then sued the bank’s directors to recover on certain 
promissory notes belonging to the bank.158 The directors argued that state 
law should govern their defenses in the case159 but the Eighth Circuit 
disagreed: 
We find this proposition doubtful. Federal jurisdiction in this 
case is based, not on diversity of citizenship, but on a federal 
equity receivership arising from violation of the federal securities 
regulation statutes. The receiver was appointed in this case to 
prevent further violations of the federal securities laws and to 
preserve the assets for the benefit of the investor-creditors of the 
companies, who are primarily individual citizens of many 
different states and whose financial interests were endangered by 
the securities law violations of the defendants. As Professor Loss 
points out, “surely this [an SEC receivership proceeding] is an 
instance of the post-Erie survival of a ‘federal common law’ (in 
this case, equity).”  
We find no cases directly in point on this issue, but an analogy 
may be drawn from the case of D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. 
F.D.I.C. In that case, the F.D.I.C. brought suit on a note which it 
had acquired an asset from collateral for a loan made to a state 
bank. The defense of want of consideration was asserted, but the 
parties could not agree on which state law was to be applied to 
the transaction, it being alleged that under Missouri law the 
defense was proper, while under Illinois law the defendant would 
be estopped to deny liability on this ground. The Supreme Court 
held that the matter was not a question of state law, but of federal 
law. There were two reasons for this result. First, the corporation 
was an agency of the federal government and second, the policy 
underlying the Federal Reserve Act to protect the assets of public 
banks from misrepresentation required the questions presented to 
be determined by federal standards. Here the receiver, while not a 
federal corporation, is an officer of a federal court appointed 
because of violations of federal law. The policy underlying the 
federal Securities Act of 1933 is to protect investors from the 
fraudulent sale of securities and the common loss of investment 
which follows from violations of the act. In unsnarling the 
tangled affairs of these corporations to preserve insofar as 
                                                                                                             
 156 Id. at 31. 
 157 Id. at 32. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
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possible assets for distribution to the defrauded investors, the 
receiver is performing a federal function. These are substantial 
reasons for applying a federal rule of decision to this case.160 
The federal interest in the Ponzi receiver context is made clear. 
According to Bryan, the federal interest is the vindication of investors 
defrauded from the Ponzi scheme operators’ violations of the Securities 
Acts. In this respect, the Receiver serves an important federal function 
and purpose by enforcing the Securities Acts through the Court’s 
ancillary powers. In essence, the receiver is made a quasi-federal agent 
whose authority is derived from the Securities Acts. This analogy 
conforms neatly to the “federal source of power” and “frustration of 
purpose” propositions described in Clearfield Trust. 
The degree to which the federal purpose would be exacerbated is 
not directly considered but assumed in Bryan. However, the discussion 
from the preceding section clearly reveals that the receiver’s practical 
barriers resulting from the adoption of conflicting state fraudulent 
conveyance law and state veil-piercing doctrines. Considering the 
implications of these factors, a serious “frustration of federal purpose” 
under Kimbell Foods’ two-pronged inquiry with respect to uniformity 
can be established. 
a. Applying the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Rule 
The need for a federal rule of law in this case far outweighs a 
state’s reliance or interest in fraudulent conveyance law. In the Ponzi 
scheme context, the reliance is irrelevant since a state’s interest in 
imposing fraudulent conveyance law is related to a debtor’s attempt to 
hide or divert assets from her creditors.161 In a Ponzi scheme, the 
transfers are paid as fictitious “profit” distributions and, though 
fraudulent, are not made with the specific intent to defraud creditors 
through the diversion of assets. Rather, the transfers are made to show 
large returns on principal investments in order to deceive and lure new 
investors so that the scheme may continue. Applying a uniform federal 
rule to this context has no implication upon or binding effect on debtor 
transactions aimed at defrauding creditors. Arguably, it is irrelevant to a 
state’s reliance on fraudulent conveyance law. Therefore, the Kimbell 
                                                                                                             
 160 Id. at 32-33 (citing 3 L. LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 1513 n.113 (1961))  
(alteration in original). Technically, the language in Bryan is dicta because the court 
stated “[e]ven if the case is deemed to be governed by Arkansas law, we have 
investigated the law of that state closely and find no conflict with the decision here 
rendered.” Id. at 33. 
 161 See generally 1 MICHIE’S JURISPRUDENCE, Fraudulent and Voluntary Conveyances, 
§§ 4, 12 (1999). 
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Foods Court’s concerns with the displacement of state law are not 
applicable in this context and a uniform federal rule may be applied 
substantively. 
The question then becomes what fraudulent transfer rule should be 
adopted as a uniform federal rule. The use of uniform statutes as federal 
common law has often been held appropriate to displace state law.162 One 
aspect to consider in this determination is which uniform law has been 
adopted by most states.163 In the past, federal courts have applied the 
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA) as federal common law.164 
Currently, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA) has replaced 
the UFCA and has been adopted by forty-two states and the District of 
Columbia.165 In the receivership context, it is reasonable to consider the 
UFTA as a national standard.166 
The language of the UFTA is considerably favorable for the 
receiver. Most significantly, the UFTA shifts the burden of having to 
prove valuable consideration of the investor in good faith by the receiver 
to having the investor prove valuable consideration. Furthermore, since 
transfers made as part of a Ponzi scheme are presumed to be fraudulent, 
it is very difficult for an investor to prove that a fictitious “profit” 
distribution is not made with the intent to defraud. Assuming valuable 
consideration is proved on the part of an investor, it will only allow for 
the retention of the principle investment and not for any profits received. 
This tilts the balance of litigation considerably in favor of the receiver. 
As a result, once it can be shown that investors have received funds in 
excess of their principle investments from a Ponzi operation, investors 
will be more likely to settle their disputes than to litigate. 
b. Federal Veil-Piercing Doctrine 
Additionally, where a violation of a federal statute benefits a 
corporation, veil-piercing under federal common law may be 
appropriate.167  Not only do violations of the Securities Acts benefit the 
offshore corporation by allowing it to profit from fraudulent transfers as 
part of a Ponzi operation, but primarily the single or majority shareholder 
                                                                                                             
 162 FDIC v. British-Am. Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1314, 1325 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (citing 
United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966); Everett Plywood & 
Door Corp. v. United States, 419 F.2d 425, 429-30 (Ct. Cl. 1969)). 
 163 See id. 
 164 See id. (citing United States v. Neidorf, 522 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1975); United 
States v. Johnston, 245 F. Supp. 433, 443 (W.D. Ark. 1965)). 
 165 See Terry v. June, 359 F. Supp. 2d 510, 520 (W.D. Va. 2005). 
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benefits from the violations as an alter ego. In other words, acceptance of 
funds from the Ponzi scheme can be construed as tortious acts falling 
outside of the corporate function to aide in violations of the Acts. 
It is firmly established that a domestic shareholder of a foreign 
corporation may be held liable for an act done by the corporation under 
the laws of the United States.168 It is also well settled that “a state may 
impose liability upon a shareholder of a foreign corporation [under the 
state’s law] for an act done by the corporation in the state, if the state’s 
relationship to the shareholder is sufficient to make reasonable the 
imposition of such liability upon him.”169  In First National City Bank v. 
Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba, the Supreme Court of the 
United States reasoned: 
As a general matter, the law of the state of incorporation 
normally determines issues relating to the internal affairs of a 
corporation. Application of that body of law achieves the need 
for certainty and predictability of result while generally 
protecting the justified expectations of parties with interests in 
the corporation. Different conflicts principles apply, however, 
where the rights of third parties external to the corporation are at 
issue. To give conclusive effect to the law of the chartering state 
in determining whether the separate juridical status of its 
instrumentality should be respected would permit the state to 
violate with impunity the rights of third parties under 
international law while effectively insulating itself from liability 
in foreign courts.170 
Whether to impose liability upon a foreign corporation under 
foreign law or United States State law is clear within the context of an 
“external” claim filed by a third party. The language of First National 
Bank can be used against foreign corporations to protect victims of torts 
committed by the corporation within the state under state law. Federal 
courts have generally considered fraudulent transfers to be torts.171 The 
application of a federal common law rule in such a case does not 
necessarily run the risk of creating precedent which will subvert 
substantive state corporate law by the imposition of federal law nor will 
it thwart any other federal policy if the transfer is considered a tort 
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committed against the Ponzi corporation. This is because the action 
should be considered “external” and beyond the scope of the corporate 
charter or an ultra vires act.172 
Arguably, a shareholder does rely significantly upon the veil-
piercing doctrine of the state in which they are incorporated. However, in 
determining whether to disregard the corporate entity, “[t]he strength of 
the particular federal interest violated must be weighed, not only against 
state corporate law, but also against other federal policies that may be 
implicated.”173 This analysis allows the court to serve as a sort of 
“gatekeeper” that balances the equities in determining whether to allow a 
veil-piercing to proceed under federal standards. It also conforms with 
the standards of Kimbell Foods. 
As discussed earlier, veil-piercing doctrines vary from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction with some being more stringent than others. It is 
conceivable for one jurisdiction to allow piercing of an offshore entity to 
reach a shareholder that has received fraudulent transfers as part of a 
Ponzi scheme while another jurisdiction will maintain the integrity of the 
corporate form.174 The danger of Clearfield Trust in “making identical 
transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several states”175 is 
evident. The federal common law standard for piercing the corporate veil 
is then appropriate. 
The federal common law veil-piercing doctrine perhaps provides 
the least cumbersome and surmountable method for reaching an offshore 
shareholder in the Ponzi scheme context. It also provides the most 
uniform approach for the receiver when dealing with such entities. The 
federal doctrine establishes a two-pronged balancing test to determine 
whether the veil should be pierced.176 The first prong asks whether there 
is “such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of 
the corporation and the individual no longer exist.”177 The second prong 
must assess whether an “inequitable result will follow ‘if the acts are 
treated as those of the corporation alone.’”178 
It is presumable that a single shareholder of the entire stock or 
majority holder of an offshore corporation receiving fraudulent transfers 
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in their entirety on behalf of the entity receives the full benefit of those 
transfers. It can easily be said that the shareholder has a unity of interest 
with the corporation. The difficulty under state law comes when an 
individual invests on behalf of the corporation as an “employee” of the 
corporation in the Ponzi operation. It becomes especially difficult when 
the offshore corporation is engaged in other legitimate business activity 
managed by the majority shareholder and is not established merely as a 
“shell” corporation. The federal common law doctrine is arguably a more 
relaxed standard and would still allow the veil to be pierced in such a 
context (where the offshore entity is engaged in a legitimate enterprise) if 
there is a minimal showing of the first factor. 
As for the second prong, the burden placed on the receiver of 
acquiring jurisdiction over the offshore corporation and the very real 
possibility that a domestic judgment against the corporation will not be 
enforced abroad certainly qualify as “inequitable results” in the event the 
veil is not pierced. The prospect speaks heavily in favor of piercing and 
while there may be only a minimal finding of “unity of interest,” the 
presence of a federal interest, that being the enforcement of the Securities 
Act by recovering lost investor funds to the Ponzi scheme, could tilt the 
balance towards piercing.    
2. The Case of Terry v. June 
While the language of Bryan was dicta,179 it proved persuasive for 
the district court in the Western District of Virginia. In this case, the 
district court exercised ancillary jurisdiction over the disgorgement 
proceedings of a receiver appointed by the SEC to recover false profits 
made as part of a multinational Ponzi scheme.180 The facts of Terry v. 
June181 are unprecedented and the court’s analysis truly reflects the 
“post-Erie survival of a ‘federal common law.’”182 
The district court appointed Roy M. Terry, Jr. and the law firm of 
DurretteBradshaw as Receivers over a fraudulent Bahamian corporation, 
“Vavasseur,” developed and marketed as an investment and trading 
program.183 Terry L. Dowdell was chief officer and administrator of the 
program.184 Over a period of approximately four years, Dowdell lured 
investors with promises of high rates of return, as high as 160 percent of 
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principle investment, in the form of “profit” distributions.185 In fact, 
Dowdell paid these “profit” distributions to investors with funds he and 
his associates solicited from newer investors.186 Dowdell and his 
associates never actually invested any money in any sort of venture.187 
The scheme, which began in Florida and later moved to Virginia, was 
entirely fraudulent.188 Ultimately, the SEC and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) discovered and shut down the operation.189 The 
scheme attracted investors from no fewer than 26 states and foreign 
countries190 and generated in excess of $121 million.191 
Robert June, Sr., a Michigan resident, was one of many investors 
involved in Dowdell’s program.192 June’s son, Robert June, Jr., was an 
employee of Dowdell who managed his father’s investments.193 
Following the collapse of the scheme, the law firm of DurretteBradshaw, 
P.L.C., filed an action in federal district court against June to recover 
funds as Receivers of Vavasseur (hereinafter “Receivers”).194 The 
Receivers alleged June had received “substantial earnings” on his 
investment which were, in reality, merely the funds of later investors in 
Dowdell’s scheme.195 The Court maintained supplemental jurisdiction 
over the case because it was ancillary to the SEC’s main case against 
Dowdell.196 
After filing a complaint against June, the Receivers moved for 
summary judgment.197 At issue was which state fraudulent conveyance 
law would be applicable to the case.198 Though the scheme and program 
were operated mainly from two states, Florida and Virginia, Virginia 
being the state where Dowdell solicited June as an investor, the Court 
concluded that the UFTA was applicable under federal common law.199 
The Court reasoned: 
[T]he present case . . . [is] one of those limited instances where 
the application of federal common law is appropriate, because 
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there is a significant conflict between the federal interests 
involved and the application of state law. First, there is a strong 
need for uniformity in the treatment of the Receiver’s various 
claims against those who allegedly received fraudulent transfers 
from the Dowdell fraud scheme. There is a federal interest in the 
consistent enforcement of the federal securities laws, in which 
the Receiver’s asset recovery efforts play a significant role. The 
Receiver has represented—and the defendant has not disputed—
that the scope of the fraud includes no fewer than 26 states and 
foreign countries. Of the many individuals around the world who 
made similar investments in the same investment program, and 
who received fictitious profits in return, it would be unfair and 
illogical to allow some of those investors to retain their profits 
while forcing others to disgorge theirs. Yet that is the possible 
result of applying the laws of different states and nations to the 
Receiver’s various suits. 
Second, the application of varying state and foreign laws 
could frustrate the objectives of the Receiver, which are federal 
in character, namely the protection of investors from the 
fraudulent sale of securities by recovering assets for distribution 
to the victim investors. The application of Virginia’s fraudulent 
conveyance law could make the recovery of assets more difficult 
in this case, because it seems to set a higher bar than does the 
UFTA for setting aside fraudulent conveyances. Moreover, the 
lack of a nationwide common law rule could subject the Receiver 
to additional litigation over the proper law to apply in different 
cases. The Receiver’s additional expenses would be paid from 
funds that would otherwise be returned to the fraud victims, 
hindering the federal interest in maximum compensation for the 
victims of securities fraud. 
The need for uniformity and the objective of asset recovery, 
by themselves, may not be sufficient grounds for applying federal 
common law. This case, however, also involves securities 
regulation—an area governed by federal laws that are enforced in 
federal courts by a federal agency, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. The Receiver here is performing federal functions. 
He was appointed by a federal court; his powers are governed by 
the court order and by federal statutes. The Receiver’s efforts are 
an integral adjunct to the SEC’s enforcement of the federal 
securities laws. The federal securities statutes confer upon district 
courts broad equitable powers to fashion appropriate remedies, 
including the appointment of a receiver, to effectuate the 
purposes of the securities laws. The Magistrate Judge’s order of 
July 12, 2002 authorizes the Receiver to take necessary 
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measures, including the bringing of legal actions, to prevent the 
dissipation of any receivership assets. The collection of these 
assets for their eventual disbursement to the fraud victims is a 
federal interest, which the court finds to be in conflict with the 
potential application of diverse state (and foreign) laws.200 
  
III. CONCLUSION 
The facts of a multinational or multi-state Ponzi scheme are 
generally very unique. The application of federal common law to ensure 
the uniformity of outcomes and to ensure the quick resolution of 
ancillary claims resulting from the fraud perpetrated against innocent 
investors in a multi-jurisdictional Ponzi scheme is not only warranted 
under such narrow circumstances but, arguably, is necessary to 
effectively accomplish the federal purpose for which the receiver is 
appointed. Courts commonly look to the spirit and purpose of the 
Securities Acts when unusual circumstances arise that threaten the 
average investor and the general integrity of the securities market.201 
Ponzi schemes should generate particular concern to courts that 
consider such potential harm. The attractive and lucrative appearance of 
a Ponzi operation is especially alluring to unsophisticated investors 
seeking a generous return on their investment. Since Ponzi schemes are 
destined to collapse, a cost-effective and time-efficient process should be 
in place to maximize recovery of lost funds. Indeed, maximum recovery 
is the goal and purpose in appointing a receiver over collapsed entities 
operating such fraudulent programs. Decreasing the time and cost of the 
receiver’s litigation certainly accomplishes this goal. Permitting the 
receiver to benefit from the adoption of a uniform fraudulent conveyance 
law under federal common law principles and also allowing a federal 
common law veil-piercing standard in actions against investors that have 
received fraudulent transfers on behalf of wholly owned offshore 
corporations goes far in accomplishing this task by setting a uniform 
standard to apply in the various disgorgement actions they must 
commence against entities which have profited from ill-gotten gains. 
Conversely, courts should be concerned with the precedent 
established by failing to adopt uniform rules under federal common law.  
Variations in fraudulent conveyance law admittedly will frustrate 
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uniformity for the receiver bringing civil ancillary actions against Ponzi 
scheme investors. A very real consequence of applying different state 
fraudulent conveyance laws to essentially the same proceedings will be, 
in the words of Terry, “unfair and illogical” since it would “allow some   
. . . investors to retain their profits while forcing others to disgorge 
theirs.”202 Furthermore, the burden placed on the receiver in resolving 
conflicts of law only increases the cost of the receiver’s litigation, which 
is paid from recovered investor funds. 
Another consequence may be an indication to shareholders of such 
offshore corporations that there is unwillingness in federal courts to hold 
individual shareholders liable through federal common law if there is a 
conflict with state corporate law. Indirect insiders who benefit from such 
schemes can often be immune from prosecution by the SEC. As a result, 
they would have an added wall of protection in setting up offshore 
entities if they could avoid civil liability by making litigation timely and 
expensive for the receiver by operating in a state with lax veil piercing 
laws and by lengthening the time to serve process on these entities. Such 
an outcome would frustrate the goal of the receiver by making 
disgorgement proceedings difficult, timely, and expensive, and could 
even discourage prosecutions. 
The receivership in the Ponzi scheme context clearly illustrates the 
necessity of federal common law. The purpose of judge-made law is to 
intervene where statutes fail to address clear injustice and a legislature 
cannot act soon enough to remedy that injustice. The dangers in usurping 
a state legislature’s authority in such a narrow context seem nonexistent. 
Federal common law exists, and must exist, to displace the inequities 
which arise and to address the unavoidable conflicts, within a system of 
government interconnected with other smaller governments. 
Furthermore, the need for more flexible and malleable principles of 
federal common law are arguably necessary in the global business 
context to maintain the integrity of federal policy and purpose in the face 
of competing foreign law, as illustrated above. 
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